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INTRODUCTION
I look forward to sharing with you some of my experiences in East
Timor, especially as they relate to the topic before us. On the flight
to Washington, I spent a moment looking at the airline's in-flight
magazine and I came upon a cartoon, which, with some
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modification, could apply to my contribution here today. In the
cartoon, a large ship is passing by a small tropical island, the kind
that often appears in such cartoons, a mere speck of land with one
palm tree surrounded by ocean. Except that on this island, the only
thing other than the palm tree is a car on which hangs the sign,
"Driver Education School." In the cartoon a sailor on the passing
ship looks at the island and the sign on the car and says to another
sailor: "I'll bet that's an interesting story!" Well, if we were to
change the car into a court and have the sign read, "Special Panels
for Serious Crimes in East Timor," I would venture to say that the
sailor in the cartoon would still be able to say, "I'll bet that's an
interesting story!" because, indeed, it is.
But I am not here to tell war stories or even war crimes stories.
Rather, in the short time that I have, I would like to discuss the
concept of "ownership" in the context of hybrid criminal tribunals,
which involve both national and international elements.
There are at least two forms of ownership as I see it. The first
refers to the notion of popular acceptance of a particular tribunal or
its work, especially within the jurisdiction to which it relates. The
degree to which the affected public accepts the process that has been
established to address the wrongs committed against them or within
their society serves as an important measure of the tribunal's
credibility and the extent to which it is perceived to have done
justice. In this sense, acceptance or public ownership supports the
legitimacy of the process itself.
There is also a second form of ownership that pertains to hybrid
criminal tribunals, and it is on this latter aspect that I would like to
focus. The second form of ownership, as I am using the term, relates
to the degree to which the national and international components
"buy in" to the process. Ultimately, the degree to which each accepts
and acknowledges its share of ownership in the tribunal will affect
the allocation of responsibility, and thus accountability, within and
for the criminal process. Simply stated, who owns the hybrid
criminal process? Or, better still, who owns what part of the process
and what are the consequences of that ownership?
For today's purposes I would like to offer the serious crimes
experience in East Timor as a lens through which to look at this
issue. East Timor also presents a unique opportunity for purposes of
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illustration because it was the first process of its kind to open, but
also the first of its kind to close. Consequently, where the tribunal
has ceased operation, it provides a chance to perform something of
an academic autopsy of a hybrid criminal process.
Prior to the formal declaration of East Timor's independence in
2002, the United Nations administered the territory as its sovereign.
With the departure of the Indonesians, the country was left a
wasteland, nowhere more so than in the judicial sector. Accordingly,
the U.N. played a primary role in re-establishing the institutional
infrastructure of the country, including the creation of a national
judiciary.
More importantly for our purposes, the U.N. established a hybrid
criminal process for the trial of serious crimes committed during the
period of Indonesian occupation. This included a court, the Special
Panels for Serious Crimes, the office of the prosecutor, the Serious
Crimes Unit, and the Defense Lawyers Unit. These elements
operated within the national legal system, but were substantially-
although not exclusively-staffed with international actors, including
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys. By way of example, each
sitting panel of the court included two international judges and one
Timorese judge.'
The term "serious crimes," as used in the title of both the court and
the prosecutor's office, refers to the most severe violations of human
rights, including genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity,
murder, sexual offenses and torture. The term "serious crimes
process" as used in East Timor, thus referred generally to legal
proceedings involving individuals accused of such offenses. Less
serious violations were referred to a Commission on Reception,
Truth and Reconciliation. Let us turn to the issue of ownership as it
arose in that setting.
1. On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Serious
Criminal Offenses Regulation, United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor [UNTAET] Reg. 2000/15, § 22.1, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June
6, 2000) [hereinafter UNTAET Regulation 15].
2006] 527
AM. U INT'L L. REV.
I. OWNERSHIP FROM WITHIN: POPULAR
ACCEPTANCE OF A TRIBUNAL
First, I would like to touch on the extent of public ownership or
"buy in" with respect to the serious crimes process. I do so
recognizing the difficulty of determining the contours of public
opinion in East Timor. The press and other media in the country are
still in the initial phases of development and do not necessarily
provide an adequate basis for determining public opinion. Similarly,
neither polling nor any other opinion study has been done, to my
knowledge, on this particular issue. Accordingly, the information on
this point is primarily anecdotal.
With that said, the major concern that has been expressed by the
Timorese public about the serious crimes process has been the failure
to prosecute those with command responsibility for the carnage in
East Timor. Essentially, the criticism is that the serious crimes
process caught only the small fish, while the larger ones swam free.
This point is generally made to highlight the fact that high-level
defendants living abroad, such as General Wiranto,2 were able to
avoid prosecution due to the lack of an extradition process between
East Timor and Indonesia. The statistics tell the tale: Of the 440
2. General Wiranto was the former Commander of the Armed Forces and
Minister of Defense of Indonesia. In that capacity he was the highest officer in the
chain of command for all military and police forces throughout Indonesia,
including the region of East Timor. He was charged with having exercised
command authority in 1999 as to those forces as well as the pro-autonomy militia
operating in East Timor and, consequently, for being responsible for the
approximately 1500 killings that occurred at the time of the referendum on
independence. According to the warrant issued for his arrest,
although he knew or had reason to know of the ongoing criminal violence in
East Timor and the involvement of the military forces, the police and the pro-
autonomy militia in such criminal activities, [he] failed to take necessary and
reasonable measures either (a) to prevent the commission of crimes by those
over whom he had command authority, or (b) to punish the perpetrators of
those crimes.
See Warrant of Arrest for Wiranto, Case No. 05/2003, at 19, available at
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/%7Ewarcrime/Serious%2OCrimes%2Unit%2OFiles/al
1documents/Wiranto/Wiranto%20case-English%2OWarrant of Arrest.pdf. The
warrant concludes that Wiranto "bears command responsibility for the criminal
actions of the military forces, police and pro-autonomy militia under his
authority." Id.
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defendants who were indicted in East Timor, over 300 remain
outside the country, presumably in Indonesia.3 Of the 87 defendants
who stood trial before the Special Panels, all were Timorese
nationals.
The serious crimes process thus became a two-track system, one
of which was a dead end, frustrating the Timorese and leading the
Commission of Experts appointed by the Secretary General to report
that "the community is not entirely satisfied with the justice process
"4
I should note, though, that Timorese concern over the prosecution
of small fish rather than large ones is not generally voiced to suggest
that the direct perpetrators of serious crimes should be spared
prosecution. Indeed, the continuation of the process has often been
endorsed at the local level not only to ensure that justice is done, but
to see that closure is brought to the numerous open cases that still
cause so much pain to so many.
I remember attending a community meeting hosted by the
Commission of Experts in which the widow of one victim stated that
she recognized that Indonesian generals such as Wiranto would
never stand trial for what happened in East Timor. Nonetheless, she
urged that serious crimes investigations continue along with the
Special Panels because she had a different concern, which she
explained to the Commission members. As she described it, the two
men who killed her husband still live in her village. They are both
former members of the Indonesian-backed militia and she sees them
every Friday on market day. It bothers her that they seem to grin at
her mockingly because, she said, they know the serious crimes
process is over and they know they will never be indicted or
prosecuted. But what really bothers her is that one of the two men
continues to wear the jacket that her husband wore on the day he
3. The War Crimes Studies Center at Berkeley has compiled a comprehensive
list of the indictees and pending charges. See U.C. Berkeley War Crimes Studies
Center, East Timor and Indonesia, Serious Crimes Unit: All Indictees,
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/-warcrime/ET.htm (follow the "website of the Serious
Crimes Unit" hyperlink; then follow the "Indictees" hyperlink).
4. Commission of Experts, Report to the Secretary-General of the
Commission of Experts to Review the Prosecution of Serious Violations of Human
Rights in Timor-Leste (the then East Timor) in 1999, Annex II, 126, U.N. Doc.
S/2005/458 (May 26, 2005).
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died. "What should I do," she asked, "when justice still needs to be
done?" Her question is one that many Timorese have asked, although
no satisfactory answer has yet been provided.
II. OWNERSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
AND DOMESTIC ACTORS
Let us now turn to the notion of ownership in the second sense that
I mentioned, as between the national and the international actors in
the process. Who owns what part of the process and what are the
consequences of that ownership?
What is critical here is to recognize that before we can even talk
about "ownership," there has to be "buy-in" on the part of the
relevant parties. In other words, if you don't buy it, you don't own it.
This proved to be a significant issue in East Timor, where neither the
U.N. as the international component nor the Timorese government as
the national component ever completely bought in to the process. As
a result, their ownership interests were never clearly defined. Indeed,
it was common for both sides to disown the process whenever it ran
afoul of what they considered to be more pressing political or
diplomatic priorities.
As a preliminary matter, I think it is fair to say that much of the
problem with respect to ownership at this level derived from the
novelty of the hybrid criminal process. In other words, the
fluctuation in national and international support for the process was
not always a function of political intrigue, but rather reflected the
administrative and material limitations in the circumstances.
First, there was no specific model to use as a point of reference
either to form the court or to conduct the process. Moreover,
establishing and sustaining judicial structures of a hybrid sort was
not something with which the U.N. had much experience. As a
result, numerous mistakes were made, especially at the outset, and
valuable time passed before the court was fully operational and the
Serious Crimes Unit had devised a coherent prosecutorial strategy.
Indeed, it is fair to say that there was no U.N. guidebook to provide
direction on how to set up a hybrid criminal process in a post-conflict
society, especially one without a judiciary. Finally, the process was
impacted by the fact that it was under-funded and under-resourced.
This resulted from the desire to provide an economy model of justice
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often referred to as "justice on the cheap."5 In any event, these
several factors all came together to create an environment in which
the chain of command was not clear, lines of responsibility were not
always apparent, and the duty to sustain and support the process was
often undefined.
I would like to touch on four particular areas in which the lack of
ownership by the parties to the hybrid process was of consequence.
A. WHO OWNS THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF THE PROCESS?
The primary contribution of the U.N. was to provide financial
support to contract national and international judges, prosecutors,
defense lawyers and support staff. The second contribution of the
U.N. was to provide supplies and services as they were needed
through the resident mission, first the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor ("UNTAET") and later the United
Nations Mission of Support in East Timor ("UNMISET").
With respect to supplies, everything-from paperclips to motor
vehicles-was to be supplied by the U.N. through the local mission.
But there was no "set-aside" of necessary items for the serious
crimes process. Rather, it was every man for himself, with the court,
prosecution and defense all competing with other mission offices and
agencies-and sometimes with each other-for available resources.
The result was that necessary supplies and services could not always
be obtained.
One example involved something as basic as electrical service.
When I arrived in East Timor in 2003, the courthouse had electricity,
at most, three days a week, owing to the unreliability of the public
electric supply to which the building was connected. The U.N.
mission, located in a separate compound, had its own large
generators and enjoyed lights, computer service and air conditioning
all day, every day. Yet the mission resisted fixing the courthouse
generator for use by the Special Panels because that was purportedly
the responsibility of the national government, as the courthouse
belonged to the Ministry of Justice. It took months before UNMISET
5. See David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor
Tribunal Really a Model for the Future?, ASIA PAC. ISSUES, Aug. 2002, at 1,
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/stored/pdfs/api061 .pdf.
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finally agreed to repair the generator, although later it refused to
supply fuel, again citing that as a national responsibility. The
Ministry of Justice grandly budgeted thousands of dollars for fuel,
but the money was never appropriated, leaving the court with
nothing more than a promise. I was finally able to negotiate an
agreement in which the U.N. and the Ministry each agreed to pay
one-half of the cost of the fuel. True to form, the Ministry never paid
its share and the court had to make due with the fuel supplied by
UNMISET.
Thus the battle was never quite won. At one point an UNMISET
administrator advised me that she could no longer guarantee fuel
deliveries after December 2004. In my email response I advised her
that as a result of that information I could no longer guarantee that
the Special Panels would conduct trials after December 2004.
Eventually, we got more fuel.
Court security was another area in which ownership was never
clear. As a national building, the courthouse was the responsibility of
the Ministry of Justice, yet the Ministry supplied no more than one
unarmed, untrained, and unequipped security guard during court
hours. As a result, the courthouse was virtually an open building and
it was not uncommon, for those who arrived early at work, to
encounter people from off the streets sleeping on the floor of the
court vestibule while others used the outdoor faucets to wash.
It was always a concern that no security was provided for victims
or witnesses, and trials were conducted without any security in the
courtroom. Moreover, although numerous U.N. international staff
worked and were stationed at the courthouse, no security assistance
was ever supplied by the U.N. mission for the premises. This was the
case even when the court was besieged by a large group of protesters
and the court gates had to be closed to prevent an incident.
B. WHO OWNS THE DIFFICULT DECISIONS OF THE SPECIAL
PANELS AND THE SERIOUS CRIMES UNIT?
It is often said that success has many fathers and failure is an
orphan. That is not unlike the experience of serving on a hybrid
tribunal, except there you are as often orphaned for your successes as
for your failures. On more than one occasion either the U.N. or the
Timorese government, and sometimes both, put distance between
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themselves and the Special Panels or the Serious Crimes Unit. This
arose in circumstances where the court or the prosecution did
something that did not fit with a particular diplomatic or political
agenda. The case of General Wiranto stands out in this regard.
In February 2003, the Serious Crimes Unit issued an indictment
against General Wiranto and seven other defendants, charging them
with crimes against humanity based on both individual and superior
responsibility. The issuance of the indictment set off a firestorm not
only in Indonesia, as would be expected, but also in East Timor and
at the U.N. The president of East Timor made a public statement in
which he expressed his regret over the indictment and asserted that it
was not in the national interest. Moreover, he underscored the
importance of good relations between East Timor and Indonesia.
The then-head of the U.N. mission in East Timor issued his own
statement distancing the U.N. from the indictment, stating, "While
indictments are prepared by international staff, they are issued under
the legal authority of the Timorese Prosecutor-General. The United
Nations does not have any legal authority to issue indictments."6 At a
press briefing at the Secretariat in New York, the U.N. spokesman
instructed reporters, "We hope that in the future you'll say 'East
Timor indicts' and not 'the United Nations indicts.' 7
While technically accurate, these statements were a far cry from
the initial Security Council resolution establishing the serious crimes
process, which adamantly called for full accountability and an end to
impunity for those responsible for the atrocities in East Timor.8
Shortly after the issuance of the indictment, the Serious Crimes Unit
was instructed to take the U.N. seal off its letterhead.
In 2004, when I issued an arrest warrant for General Wiranto, who
was then a candidate for president of Indonesia, I was criticized by
Timorese authorities as a U.N. judge, while U.N. representatives
repeated the refrain that I worked as a judge within the Timorese
6. Press Release, UNMISET, Serious Crimes Process in Timor-Leste (Feb.
25, 2003), available at http://www.un/org/depts/dpko/missions/unmiset/pr25020
3b.pdf.
7. Timor-Leste, Not UN, Indicts Indonesian General for War Crimes, U.N.
NEWS CTR., Feb. 23, 2003, http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewslD=
6273&Cr-timor&Crl=.
8. See S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
20061
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
court system. This time the President of East Timor responded by
flying to Bali where he met General Wiranto and gave him a much-
photographed friendly bear hug for the benefit of the Indonesian
electorate. The Timorese Prosecutor General, in turn, refused to
submit the arrest warrant to Interpol. Although he had submitted
such warrants in the past, he refused to do so in the case of Wiranto
and all subsequent defendants, thus abandoning the very process that
could assist in the apprehension of those charged with serious
criminal offenses in East Timor.
From the outset, Timorese authorities were, at best, ambivalent
about the serious crimes process based on their view that doing
justice in a formal sense would either threaten the development of
democratic forces in Indonesia or harm relations between that
country and East Timor. From such a point it is a short distance to
saying, as has been stated by Timorese officials on numerous
occasions, that the serious crimes process is not a joint effort
between Timor and the international community, but rather an
initiative that was imposed on East Timor when the U.N. had the
power of the pen.
This view also reflects the concern that East Timor, rather than the
international community, will bear the political burden of any
continuation of the serious crimes process. Although East Timor is
one of the youngest nation in the world with a judiciary in its
formative stages, it must now decide how to treat over three hundred
arrest warrants and numerous pending indictments left behind by a
criminal process that throughout its existence was dependent on
international support. Although many of the remaining cases involve
high-ranking and prominent individuals from East Timor's largest
and most powerful neighbor, the significant political cost of pursuing
these prosecutions has been lifted from the shoulders of the world
community and placed on those of the Timorese.
The fact that the hybrid criminal process is neither fish nor fowl
thus provides an opportunity for both the national government and
the international community to walk away when they consider it
beneficial to do so. The problem, of course, is when those two
components, which are supposed to be supportive of the process,
begin to see it as a nuisance or, worse, as adverse to their interests.
Not only does it make for bad relations between the process and its
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patrons, but it also creates an environment in which the court
becomes isolated even though it needs and has a right to expect the
administrative, material and even moral support of its sponsors. It is
a slippery slope from such neglect to more obvious challenges to the
independence of the judicial process. Indeed, such challenges
became quite overt, at least from the Timorese side, which was
unrelenting in its critique of the Special Panels and its decisions.
C. WHO OWNS THE LEGACY OF THE SERIOUS CRIMES PROCESS?
Although the U.N. has put distance between itself and the Special
Panels as it felt necessary, there was one occasion where the
connection between the two was made eminently clear. In 2004, the
Security Council passed Resolution 1543, ordering that its support
for the serious crimes process would end on May 20, 2005. 9 The
Council further ordered the Serious Crimes Unit to stop all
investigations in November 2004 and the Special Panels to complete
all trials by May 20, 2005.11 In Resolution 1599, it went on to order
the Special Panels and the Serious Crimes Unit to preserve a
complete copy of all compiled records.I1
These directives gave rise to a number of issues concerning the
relationship of the serious crimes process to the Timorese
government and the U.N. In the case of Special Panels records, the
court was in a quandary, with the President of the Court of Appeal
representing the national judiciary, ordering that all Special Panels
court files be immediately transferred to the Dili District Court. On
the other hand, U.N. officials directed that the handover process be
suspended, pending further action by that body. In the end, the U.N.
eventually accepted that all serious crimes court files were the
property of the Timorese court system and could be handed over to
the Registrar of the Dili District Court. This was finally
accomplished at a formal ceremony that effectively marked the end
of the Special Panels, thus avoiding a confrontation between the
national and international partners to the process.
9. S.C. Res. 1543, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1543 (May 14, 2004).
10. Id. 8.
11. S.C. Res. 1599, 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1599 (Apr. 28, 2005).
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The handover issue relating to the Serious Crimes Unit proved to
be far more complicated. This was due in large part to the
confidential nature of many of the documents in the possession of the
lead international prosecutor who, reflecting his own hybrid status,
was hired by the U.N. to work as a Deputy Prosecutor General under
the Timorese Prosecutor General.
To the extent that the serious crimes process focused on the 1400
murders and other serious offenses committed in 1999, the 95
indictments filed with the Special Panels accounted for only 572 of
those killings. As a result of the order of the Security Council,
investigations into the remaining deaths were terminated.
Nonetheless, the investigative files of the Serious Crimes Unit
contain thousands of pages of witness statements, most of them taken
on a confidential basis.
Two positions quickly emerged on the issue of access to these
statements. The international and diplomatic community urged that
such access be restricted where international prosecutors had
guaranteed their confidentiality. Timorese authorities took the
position that all records were generated under the auspices of the
Prosecutor General and thus fall under his exclusive authority.
The immediate significance of how this issue is resolved relates to
whether or not the members of the recently established Truth and
Friendship Commission will be permitted access to those materials.
The Timorese government has stated that, in principle, those items
should be available to the Commission's investigators, resulting in
direct Indonesian access to information that incriminates members of
that country's military. The understandable fear is that this
information will be routed to those who are implicated in the crimes
that were committed, thus putting at risk those who spoke out
thinking that their names would never be disclosed. This is especially
troubling as to those witnesses who still live in the Indonesian
province of West Timor and who could suffer more direct
consequences.
As matters currently stand, the records in question remain under
U.N. lock and key at the former offices of the Serious Crimes Unit in
Dili and negotiations with respect to their disposition continue. The
present consensus appears to be that the documents will come under
the control of the Prosecutor General, although the terms and
[21:525
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conditions of the transfer and their subsequent availability have not
been publicly announced.
D. WHO OWNS THE SERIOUS CRIMES PROCESS GOING
FORWARD NOW THAT THE SPECIAL PANELS AND
THE SERIOUS CRIMES UNIT ARE CLOSED?
Although the serious crimes process ended in May 2005, its work
has not been concluded. As previously noted, the investigations into
hundreds of murders and other serious crimes were ended by order of
the Security Council, which chose to close down the process.
Although the Timorese Prosecutor General has the legal authority to
continue those investigations, his office does not have the capacity,
the resources, or the political will to do so. Moreover, even though
the Commission of Experts has made a number of proposals relating
to the continued investigation of these matters, including the
continuation of the serious crimes process with international
assistance, it is highly unlikely that the Security Council will approve
such a course.
There is another issue that will be more difficult to ignore. As I
have pointed out, there are a large number of indicted serious crimes
defendants in Indonesia, many of whom are in West Timor. In the
event that such defendants should return to East Timor and be
apprehended, there needs to be a properly constituted court in place
to conduct their trials, along with a plan for both their prosecution
and defense. To date, no such structure exists and no coherent
strategy to resolve the problem has been proposed, either by the
Timorese authorities or by the United Nations.
The issue is no longer a hypothetical one. On July 27, 2005,
Timorese police arrested one Manuel Maia, who is under indictment
for crimes against humanity arising out of the violence that occurred
in 1999. Absent a forum in which to conduct his trial, Maia remains
in custody to this day. This situation, which is bound to be repeated,
underscores the immediacy of the problem: although both the
Timorese Constitution12 and UNTAET regulations,13 which still have
12. E. TIMOR CONST. § 160, available at http://www.etan.org/etanpdf/pdf2/
constfnen.pdf.
13. UNTAET Regulation 15, supra note 1, § 22.
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the effect of law, call for the trial of serious crimes defendants before
a special panel of national and international judges, no such entity
now exists.
It is rumored that the President of the Court of Appeal has
indicated that he shall compose a mixed panel using Portuguese
judges who are in East Timor to assist the national judiciary and to
hear local cases involving ordinary crimes. It should be noted that
these judges, whatever their other merits may be, were not recruited
to hear the kinds of serious crimes cases that they will now face. In
any event, it is highly doubtful that in the midst of their already busy
regular workload the judges will be able to devote the time and
attention that such serious matters demand.1 4 Moreover, it is still
unclear who will prosecute and who will defend such defendants, as
the weight of that responsibility previously fell entirely on
international staff.
Before concluding, I should mention the Commission of Truth and
Friendship that was created bilaterally by Indonesia and East Timor
for the purpose of establishing what its terms of reference describe as
the "conclusive truth"15 regarding the history of violence in East
Timor. The Commission's work has not yet been elaborated other
than to make clear that it will not refer any cases for prosecution and
that in appropriate cases amnesty may be provided to those who tell
their story and thereby contribute to the determination of the
"conclusive truth."
The Commission of Experts expressed its "grave reservations"
regarding the Truth and Friendship Commission and recommended
against international "financial and/or advisory support" absent a
change in the body's terms of reference. 16 Although it is always
possible that behind-the-scenes discussions are now under way,
14. The criminal and civil caseload currently being handled by the international
judges in East Timor is approximately 3000 cases. See The Secretary-General,
Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Office in Timor-
Leste, 20, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/24 (Jan. 17,
2006).
15. Commission of Truth and Friendship Indonesia-Timor Leste, Terms of
Reference for the Commission of Truth and Friendship Established by the Republic
of Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 12, http://www.ctf-ri-
tl.org (follow "Terms of Reference" hyperlink).
16. Commission of Experts, supra note 4, 355.
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neither the Secretary General nor those nations that are donors to
East Timor have publicly spoken out as strongly as the Commission
of Experts. Regardless of the eventual result, the momentum for
controlling the future agenda with respect to serious crimes issues is
clearly on the side of the national governments of East Timor and
Indonesia.17
CONCLUSION
Throughout the serious crimes experience, neither the U.N. nor the
government of East Timor ever demonstrated a clear sense of
ownership of the very process in which they were partners. Although
both agreed with the need for an end to impunity, neither appeared
ready to see that accomplished by an independent, fully resourced
tribunal or prosecutor's office. In the end, perhaps the question of
ownership overlapped with the issue of control and neither the U.N.
nor East Timor wished to take responsibility for what they did not
consider wholly their own. In that sense, the hybrid process was too
much a bastard child for either to claim paternity, and the orphan
status of the Special Panels and the Serious Crimes Unit was too
often apparent.
The good news out of all this is that there have been many lessons
learned from the serious crimes process in East Timor. The challenge
will be to make use of them in the years ahead as other hybrid
17. Following the presentation of these remarks, on September 28, 2005, the
President of the Security Council addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in
which he acknowledged the Council's receipt of the report of the Commission of
Experts on June 24, 2005. President of the Security Council, Letter from the
President of the Security Council Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/2005/613 (Sept. 28, 2005). The President went on to state that the members of
the Security Council
take note of the contents of the report and, prior to further consideration of it,
would request the Secretary-General, in close consultation with his Special
Representative for Timor-Leste, to submit a report on justice and
reconciliation for Timor-Leste with a practically feasible approach, taking
into account the report of the Commission of Experts, as well as the views
expressed by Indonesia and Timor-Leste.
Id. It is noteworthy that the letter of the Council President does not establish a
timeframe for the submission of this further report. As of the date of publication,
the Secretary-General has not yet submitted the requested report to the Security
Council.
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experiments, such as the one about to commence in Cambodia, come
onto the scene.
